Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence

Siegrfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Jianying Qiu

No 07-03, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: In a duopoly market, aspirations express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspirations. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, beliefs, aspirations, or sales have to be adapted. In a second phase, testing the absorption of satisficing, participants are free to select nonsatisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most people are satisficers who, either mandatorily or deliberately, tend to adjust aspiration levels if they cannot be satisfied.

Keywords: Satisficing behavior; Bounded rationality; Duopoly; Theory absorption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2564/1/dp07_03.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2009)
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2564

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