Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption

Luis Angeles () and Kyriakos Neanidis

Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series from Economics, The University of Manchester

Abstract: This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial times is used to di¤erentiate between types of colonial experience, and is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European settlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-pke and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption (2010)
Working Paper: Colonialism, elite Formation and corruption
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:cgbcrp:144

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