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Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues

Published: 08 May 2019 Publication History

Abstract

Single Transferable Vote (STV) is used in large political elections around the world. It is easy to understand and has desirable normative properties such as clone-proofness. However, voters need to report full rankings, which can make it less practical than plurality voting. We study ways to minimize the amount of communication required to use single-winner STV. In the first part of the paper, voters are assumed to report their top-k alternatives in a single shot. We empirically evaluate the extent to which STV with truncated ballots approximates STV with full information. We also study the computational complexity of the possible winner problem for top-k ballots. For $k=1$, it can be solved in polynomial time, but is NP-complete when $k\geq 2$. In the second part, we consider interactive communication protocols for STV. Building on a protocol proposed by Conitzer and Sandholm (2005), we show how we can reduce the amount of communication required in practice. We then study empirically the average communication complexity of these protocols, based on randomly generated profiles, and on real-world election data. Our conclusion is that STV needs, in practice, much less information than in the worst case.

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cover image ACM Conferences
AAMAS '19: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
May 2019
2518 pages
ISBN:9781450363099

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

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Published: 08 May 2019

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Author Tags

  1. approximation
  2. communication protocol
  3. stv
  4. truncated ballots

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AAMAS '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 193 of 793 submissions, 24%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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