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NSPW '11: Proceedings of the 2011 New Security Paradigms Workshop
ACM2011 Proceeding
Publisher:
  • Association for Computing Machinery
  • New York
  • NY
  • United States
Conference:
NSPW '11: 2011 New Security Paradigms Workshop Marin County California USA September 12 - 15, 2011
ISBN:
978-1-4503-1078-9
Published:
12 September 2011

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Abstract

The New Security Paradigms workshop (NSPW) is unique among conferences, focusing on work that directly challenges long-held beliefs about security, or that challenges attendees to look at problems -- and their solutions -- in entirely new ways. This year's papers continue this tradition, with work that touches on many of the major challenges facing computer security today. Resilience, Usable Security and Human Factors, Privacy and Inference, Web Application Security... all these problems were examined, as well as less mature areas, including how we should approach solving security problems and how we can appropriately evaluate solutions. We even had a paper that explored what happens (or should happen) to your digital identity after death! Each paper in some way challenged previously-held assumptions, and forced attendees to carefully examine their beliefs.

As one might expect, reviewing papers that are designed to be provocative was a non-trivial undertaking. Our twelve program committee members (to whom we are extraordinarily grateful) each reviewed approximately eight papers, and then began a vigorous discussion on the merits of each, sometimes resulting in some committee members being asked for additional reviews of papers that seemed especially contentious. Unlike other security conferences, NSPW seeks those submissions that hold truly new paradigms, even if not proven, and so often the discussion over each paper can be very spirited as committee members discuss the novelty of the paradigms being presented. Once consensus had been reached, shepherds were assigned to each accepted paper, in order to help authors prepare for the workshop experience.

As a participant, the NSPW experience is unusual. Attendees agree to a "psychological contract," where each person agrees to try to foster new thought, attend all sessions (without having one's nose buried in a laptop!), and, above all, engage in the discussion. Presentations quickly deviate from their script as presenters respond to questions and comments from the audience, and it is not unheard of for the vast majority of each talk to be filled with a two-way conversation with the audience rather than a one-way transfer of information. Despite this vigorous discussion, however, NSPW remains above all a nurturing venue, and one in which we are happy (and proud) to place students as presenters.

In order to further help authors refine their ideas, all the discussions for each paper are recorded by two scribes, who then provide their notes to the authors for reference while they prepare the camera-ready versions of their papers. This is another area where NSPW deviates from traditional security conferences -- papers are not submitted for publication until after the workshop has ended, and authors are expected to revise their submissions based on the feedback they received at the workshop.

As should be clear, NSPW thus required a significantly larger time and energy commitment from program committee members, authors, and participants than is the norm for security venues. We believe their effort was worthwhile; after reading these proceedings, we hope you will agree. In closing, we would like to thank the scribes, the organizers of the workshop, all the program committee members and external reviewers, other workshop attendees, and especially the authors for making this year's workshop yet another success in the NSPW series. We hope to see you all again at next year's workshop!

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SESSION: Papers
research-article
Security and privacy considerations in digital death

Death is an uncomfortable subject for many people, and digital systems are rarely designed to deal with this event. In particular, the wide array of existing digital authentication infrastructure rarely deals with gracefully retiring credentials in a ...

research-article
Reducing normative conflicts in information security

Security weaknesses often stem from users trying to comply with social expectations rather than following security procedures. Such normative conflicts between security policies and social norms are therefore undesirable from a security perspective. It ...

research-article
A multi-word password proposal (gridWord) and exploring questions about science in security research and usable security evaluation

Our agenda is two-fold. First, we introduce and give a technical description of gridWord, a novel knowledge-based authentication mechanism involving elements of both text and graphical passwords. It is intended to address a new research challenge ...

research-article
Applying problem-structuring methods to problems in computer security

Solutions to security problems, particularly ones involving cryptography, have typically been approached through the Inside-Out Threat Model, "this is our solution and whatever it addresses is the threat". Email encryption/signing and SSL/TLS are two ...

research-article
Towards a formal model of accountability

We propose a focus on accountability as a mechanism for ensuring security in information systems. To that end, we present a formal definition of it accountability in information systems. Our definition is more general and potentially more widely ...

research-article
Influencing mental models of security: a research agenda

Over 80 million households in the United States have a home computer and an Internet connection. The vast majority of these are administered by people who have little computer security knowledge or training, and many users try to avoid making security ...

research-article
The security cost of cheap user interaction

Human attention is a scarce resource, and lack thereof can cause severe security breaches. As most security techniques rely on considerate human intervention in one way or another, this resource should be consumed economically. In this context, we ...

research-article
Position paper: why are there so many vulnerabilities in web applications?

As the Web has become more and more ubiquitous, the number of attacks on web applications have increased substantially. According to a recent report, over 80 percent of web applications have had at least one serious vulnerability. This percentage is ...

research-article
Resilience is more than availability

In applied sciences there is a tendency to rely on terminology that is either ill-defined or applied inconsistently across areas of research and application domains. Examples in information assurance include the terms resilience, robustness and ...

research-article
Sherlock holmes' evil twin: on the impact of global inference for online privacy

User-supplied content--in the form of photos, videos, and text--is a crucial ingredient to many web sites and services today. However, many users who provide content do not realize that their uploads may be leaking personal information in forms hard to ...

research-article
Public security: simulations need to replace conventional wisdom

Is more always better? Is conventional wisdom always the right guideline in the development of security policies that have large opportunity costs? Is the evaluation of security measures after their introduction the best way? In the past, these ...

research-article
Gaming security by obscurity

Shannon sought security against the attacker with unlimited computational powers: if an information source conveys some information, then Shannon's attacker will surely extract that information. Diffie and Hellman refined Shannon's attacker model by ...

Contributors
  • Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
  • Florida Institute of Technology
  • Dalhousie University
  • Microsoft Research
  1. Proceedings of the 2011 New Security Paradigms Workshop
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    Recommendations

    Acceptance Rates

    Overall Acceptance Rate 98 of 265 submissions, 37%
    YearSubmittedAcceptedRate
    NSPW '18311135%
    NSPW '14321134%
    NSPW '13321134%
    NSPW '10321341%
    NSPW '09361233%
    NSPW '07271141%
    NSPW '02401435%
    NSPW '00351543%
    Overall2659837%